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ABSTRACT
Businesses routinely rely on econometric models to analyze and predict consumer behavior. Estimation of such models
may require combining a rm's internal data with external datasets to take into account sample selection, missing
observations, omitted variables and errors in measurement within the existing data source. In this paper we point
out that these data problems can be addressed when estimating econometric models from combined data using the
data mining techniques under mild assumptions regarding the data distribution. However, data combination leads
to serious threats to security of consumer data: we demonstrate that point identication of an econometric model
from combined data is incompatible with restrictions on the risk of individual disclosure. Consequently, if a consumer
model is point identied, the rm would (implicitly or explicitly) reveal the identity of at least some of consumers in
its internal data. More importantly, we provide an argument that unless the rm places a restriction on the individual
disclosure risk when combining data, even if the raw combined dataset is not shared with a third party, an adversary
or a competitor can gather condential information regarding some individuals from the estimated model.
JEL Classication: C35, C14, C25, C13.
Keywords: Data protection, model identication, data combination.
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With the Internet now an established part of everyday life, issues and concerns regarding data
security are now big news and generate front page headlines. Private businesses and government
entities are collecting and storing increasing amounts of condential personal data. This is accom-
panied by an unprecedented increase in publicly available (or searchable) individual information
that comes from search trac, social networks and personal online le depositories (such as photo
collections) amongst others. Large businesses are routinely using multiple sources of information to
study and predict the behavior of consumers. For instance, sponsored ads on Google are based on
the consumer's information from their Gmail prole and their associated geographical or locational
information.
Increasingly, businesses are declaring their commitment to the protection and security of personal
data. Executives of several leading Internet companies have made multiple statements in the press
stating the importance of customer privacy.1 However, all those businesses rely on accurate and in-
depth consumer behavior information and intelligence. In fact, advertising on the Internet is based
on the estimation of the empirical models of consumer responses to ads (in terms of clicks, views, or
purchases) from individual-level data. We can use Internet advertising as an example of the potential
tradeos in using and collecting consumer-level data. To provide advertising targeted to a specic
consumer, a company will be interested in the estimation of the model of the consumer's propensity
to click on an ad (or purchase the advertised product or service) based on available data. First of
all, available data that contains information regarding the actual page views and actual clicks or
purchases will suer from sample selection as most of the data will correspond to the customers who
were already interested in a specic product and were searching for it.
As a result, the data on customers who could be interested in the product may not be recorded.
Second, some individual-level variables may be missing. For instance, the age and gender information
will only be available if the customer provides it themselves, for instance, whilst signing up for a free
e-mail service. This will create a familiar omitted variable bias. Third, the data may be prone to
errors of measurement. For instance, if the consumer uses a proxi server to connect to the internet,
their location data will be obscured. To correct any bias in the estimates of behavioral consumer
models, it is necessary to use auxiliary information.
In this paper we investigate how the potential need for data combination aects the probability of
recovery of a customer's \true" identity (such as name and physical home address). In other words,
we want to answer the following question: 'Is the scope for data combination compatible with the
limitations imposed on the disclosure of consumer identity?' In our empirical illustration we are
interested in estimating the model of individual preferences for restaurants using the rating data
from Yelp.com.
Yelp users rank restaurants based on their dining experience. However, this data will obviously be
1See, for instance, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/facebook-executive-answers-reader-questions/
1prone to selection bias: consumers who dine more frequently may be more likely to write reviews.
Using the record linkage technique adopted from data mining literature, we merge the restaurant
review data with the data on individual locations and property values which we use to control
the sample selection. Our theoretical analysis shows that combining data with the aim of bias
correction relies on observing data entries with infrequent attribute values in the two combined
datasets. Accurate links for these entries can disclose consumer identities. Further, we analyse
how the estimates of the consumer behavior model will be aected by the constraints on identity
disclosure. As we nd, any such limitation leads to a loss of point identication in the model of
interest. In other words, we nd that there is a clear-cut tradeo between the restrictions imposed
on identity disclosure and the point identication of the consumer behavior model.
Our analysis combines the ideas from data mining literature with those from literature on statistical
disclosure limitation, as well as literature on model identication with corrupted or contaminated
data. We provide a new approach to model identication from combined datasets as a limit in the
sequence of statistical experiments.
We provide a new approach to model identication from combined datasets as a limit in the sequence
of statistical experiments. Combination of data in the consumer dataset with individual information
from auxiliary data may lead to the possibility of so-called linkage attacks. A linkage attack will
be successful if one can provide a link between at least one data entry and auxiliary individual
information with the probability exceeding the selected condence threshold.
The optimal structure of such attacks, as well as the requirements in relation to the data release have
been studied in computer science literature. The structure of linkage attacks is based on the optimal
record linkage results that have been long used in the analysis of databases and data mining. To some
extent, these results were used in econometrics for combination of datasets as described in Ridder
and Mott (2007). In record linkage one provides a (possibly) probabilistic rule that can match the
records from one dataset with the records from the other dataset in an eort to link the data entries
corresponding to the same individual. In several striking examples, computer scientists have shown
that the simple removal of personal information such as names and social security numbers does
not protect the data from individual disclosure. Sweeney (2002b) identied the medical records of
William Weld, then governor of Massachusetts, by linking voter registration records to \anonymised"
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) medical encounter data, which retained the
birthdate, sex, and zip code of the patient. Recent \de-personalised" data released for the Netix
prize challenge turned out to lead to a substantial privacy breach. As shown in Narayanan and
Shmatikov (2008), using auxiliary information one can detect the identities of several Netix users
from the movie selection information and other data stored by Netix.
As the identity disclosure threat is posed by the linkage attacks, we can dene the restriction on
disclosure risk in terms of probabilistic guarantees against the linkage attacks. We can use, what
Lambert (1993) calls, a pessimistic measure of the risk of disclosure. It is the maximum upper bound
on the probability of linking the individual information from the public data with the record in the
2released anonymised data sample. The technology to control the risk of identity disclosure exists,
so the bounds on disclosure risk are practically enforceable.
Samarati and Sweeney (1998), Sweeney (2002b), Sweeney (2002a), LeFevre, DeWitt, and Ramakrish-
nan (2005), Aggarwal, Feder, Kenthapadi, Motwani, Panigrahy, Thomas, and Zhu (2005), LeFevre,
DeWitt, and Ramakrishnan (2006), Ciriani, di Vimercati, Foresti, and Samarati (2007) developed
and implemented the approach called k-anonymity to address the threat of linkage attacks. Intu-
itively, a database provides k-anonymity, for some number k, if every way of singling an individual
out of the database returns records for at least k individuals. In other words, anyone whose infor-
mation is stored in the database can be \confused" with k others. Several operational prototypes
for maintaining k-anonymity have been oered for practical use. The data combination procedure
will then respect the required bound on the disclosure risk if it only uses the links with at least k
possible matches.
A dierent solution is oered by the literature on synthetic data. Duncan and Lambert (1986),
Duncan and Mukherjee (1991), Duncan and Pearson (1991), Fienberg (1994), and Fienberg (2001)
Duncan, Fienberg, Krishnan, Padman, and Roehrig (2001), Abowd and Woodcock (2001) show that
synthetic data may be a useful tool for the analysis of particular distributional properties of the data
such as tabulations, while guaranteeing a certain value for the measure of the individual disclosure
risk (for instance, the probability of \singling out" some proportion of the population from the data).
An interesting feature of the synthetic data is that they can be robust against stronger requirements
for disclosure risk. Dwork and Nissim (2004) and Dwork (2006) introduced the notion of dierential
privacy that provides a probabilistic disclosure risk guarantee against the privacy breach associated
with an arbitrary auxiliary data. Abowd and Vilhuber (2008) demonstrate a striking result that
the release of synthetic data is robust to dierential privacy. As a result, one can use the synthetic
data to enforce the constraints on disclosure risk by replacing the actual consumer data with the
synthetic consumer data for combination with an auxiliary individual data source.
Although our identication approach is new, to understand the impact of the bounds on the individ-
ual disclosure risk we use ideas from literature on partial identication of models with contaminated
or corrupted data. Manski (2003), Horowitz, Manski, Ponomareva, and Stoye (2003), Horowitz and
Manski (2006), Magnac and Maurin (2008) have understood that many data modications such
as top-coding surpression of attributes and stratication lead to the loss of point identication of
parameters of interest. Consideration of the general setup in Molinari (2008) allows one to assess
the impact of some data \anonymisation" as a general misclassication problem. In this paper we
nd the approach of constructing identied sets for parameters of interest extremely informative. As
we show in this paper, the size of the identied set for the parameter in the linear model is directly
proportional to the pessimistic measure of disclosure risk. This is a powerful result that essentially
states that there is a direct conict between the informativeness of the data used in the consumer
behavioral model and the security of individual data. As a result, combination of the company's
internal data with the auxiliary public individual data is not compatible with the non-disclosure
3of individual identities. An increase in the complexity and nonlinearity of the model can further
worsen the tradeo.
In this paper we associate the ability of the company to recover the true identity of consumers
from internal data with the risk of individual disclosure. This does not mean that we expect the
company that constructs the consumer behavior model to misuse the data or intentionally compro-
mise the identities of consumers. However, in some cases the consumer behavior model may itself
be disclosive. For instance, Korolova (2010) shows examples of privacy breaches through micro ad
targeting on Facebook.com. Facebook does not give advertisers direct access to user data. Instead,
the advertiser interface allows them to create targeted advertising campaigns with a very granular
set of targets. In other words, one can create a set of targets that will isolate a very small group
of Facebook users (based on location, friends and likes). Korolova shows that certain users can be
perfectly isolated from other users with a particularly detailed list of targets. Then, one can recover
the \hidden" consumer attributes, such as age or sexual orientation, by constructing dierential
advertising campaigns such that a dierent version of the ad will be shown to the user depending
on the value of the private attribute. Then the advertiser's tools allow the advertiser to observe
which version of the ad was shown to the Facebook user. When an online advertising company uses
a consumer behavior model to show the ads to consumers who are likely to respond to them, this
may lead to identity disclosure. Returning to the Facebook advertising example, if one targets the
ad to isolate a very small group of consumers or a single consumer and the consumer behavior model
suggests that the ad will be more eective for high-income individuals, then the fact that the ad was
shown will indicate that the targeted consumer is likely a high-income individual.
Security of individual data is not synonymous to privacy, as privacy may have subjective value
for consumers (see Acquisti (2004)). Privacy is a complicated concept that frequently cannot be
expressed as a formal guarantee against intruders' attacks. Considering personal information as
a \good" valued by consumers leads to important insights in the economics of privacy. As seen
in Varian (2009), this approach allowed the researchers to analyse the release of private data in
the context the tradeo between the network eects created by the data release and utility loss
associated with this release. The network eect can be associated with the loss of competitive
advantage of the owner of personal data, as discussed in Taylor (2004), Acquisti and Varian (2005),
Calzolari and Pavan (2006). Consider the setting where rms obtain a comparative advantage due
to the possibility of oering prices that are based on the past consumer behavior. Here, subjective
individual perception of privacy is important. This is clearly shown in both the lab experiments in
Gross and Acquisti (2005), Acquisti and Grossklags (2008), as well as in the real-world environment
in Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006), Miller and Tucker (2009) and Goldfarb and Tucker (2010).
Given all these ndings, we believe that the disclosure protection plays a cenral role in the privacy
discourse, as privacy protection is imossible without the data protection.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the econometric problem
and dene the parameter of interest. In Section 3 we give sucient condition for identication of
4consumer behavior model from combined data. In Section 4 we give the denition of disclosure
risk and study identication of the econometric model under restrictions on the disclosure risk. In
Section 5 we provide the nal remarks and conclude.
2 Econometric model
Suppose that consumer behavior model is based on the joint distribution of the vector-valued con-
sumer response Y 2 Y  Rm and consumer characteristics X 2 X  Rk. The economic parameter
of interest 0 (contained in the convex compact set ) denes the consumer response model
E [(Y;X;0)jX = x] = 0: (2.1)
We will focus on a linear separable model for () as our lead example, which can be directly
extended to monotone nonlinear models. In a typical Internet environment consumer choices may
include purchases in an online store, specic messages on a discussion board, comments on a rating
website or a prole on a social networking or dating website. Consumer characteristics are the
relevant socio-demographic characteristics such as location, demographic characteristics, and social
links with other individuals. We assume that for the true joint distribution of Y and X there is only
one 0 satisfying condition (2.1). Formally we write this as the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1. Parameter 0 is uniquely determined from the moment equation (2.1) and the
population conditional distribution Y jX.
For empirical illustration we estimate the model of consumer's rating of a restaurant (expressed as a
rank score) as a function of the characteristics of the restaurant and demographic characteristics of
consumers. We use the publicly available online data to estimate the model. We decided to focus on
a specic geographic region, Durham, NC, to estimate the model. In order to obtain the restaurant
information and the consumers opinions, we use the restaurant description and the user review
from yelp.com, collecting information regarding all the restaurants located in Durham, NC. The
data contains the user evaluation of the restaurant with the verbal description of the personal user
experience as well as the restaurant details such as a price level category, cuisine type, hours of work
and location. The information about users contains the self-reported user location, self-reported
rst name as well as all the reviews by each user. To obtain reliable personal information we
collected the property tax data available for local taxpayers in Durham county. This data reects
the property tax paid for residential real estate along with some characteristics of the property
owner (such as name), location and the appraisal value of the property. If we had the data from
yelp.com merged individual-by-individual with the data on the property tax, then for each consumer
review we would know both the score that the consumer assigned to the restaurant, as well as all
restaurant and consumer characteristics. In reality, however, there is no unique identier that labels
the observations in both data sources.
This means that the variables of interest Y and X will not be observed simultaneously. One can
separately observe the dataset containing values of Y and the dataset containing the values of X
5for the subsets of the same population. The following assumption formalizes the idea of the data
sample broken into two separate datasets.
ASSUMPTION 2. (i) The population is characterized by a joint distribution of vector-valued
random variables (Y;W;X;V ) with values contained in Y W X V  Rm Rq Rk Rr.
(ii) The (infeasible) data sample fyi;wi;xi;vign
i=1 is a random sample from the population distri-
bution of the data.
(iii) The observable data is formed by two independently created random data subsamples from
the sample of size n such that the rst data subsample is Dy = fyj;wjgN
y
j=1 and the second
subsample is Dx = fxj;vjgN
x
j=1.
Assumption 2 characterizes the observable variables as independently drawn subsamples of the
infeasible \master" data. This means that without any additional information, one can only re-
construct marginal distributions fX() and fY ().
In case of a linear model identication with split sample data reduces to computing the familiar
Fr echet bounds. Suppose that Y and X are continuous scalar random variables and the object of





Given that the information regarding the joint distribution of Y and X is not known, the covariance
between Y cannot be directly estimated from the marginal distributions. As a result, only trivial
information is available for the joint moments of the regressor and the outcome, which we may










We can note that the constructed bounds are extremely wide especially when the regressor has small
support. Moreover, we cannot even identify the direction of the relationship between the regressor
and the outcome, which is extremely important in most economic applications.
Fr echet bounds for the estimated parameters are constructed on the premise that no additional
information is available regarding the joint distribution of X and Y . Returning to our empirical
example, we can note that consumer choice information and the consumer demographics are not
completely unrelated. For instance, we may expect that consumers tend to go more frequently to
the restaurants that are located closer to where they live. Also, it is likely that the self-reported name
in the user review on yelp.com is highly correlated with the real name of the user. In general, we can
formalize detection of the related variables in disjoint data as construction of vector-valued functions
of the data which we expect to take proximate values if observations in two datasets correspond to
the same individual and expect those values to be further for dierent individuals. Construction of
6such classiers is widely discussed in the modern computer science literature especially in relation
to record linkage and data recovery. In this paper we take the procedure for construction of such
classiers as given and illustrate practical implementation of such a procedure in our empirical
example. In the following assumption we express the requirements on the data classiers.
ASSUMPTION 3. We assume that there exist functions Zx = Zx (X;V ) and Zy = Zy (Y;W)
with the values in R that are evaluated at the variables contained in the datasets Dx and Dy. For





 X = x;jZxj > 1
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





  Y = y

=  () + o( ()) for some non-decreasing and positive at  > 0 func-
tions () and  ().
(iii) For almost all x 2 X,
f(Y jX = x;Zx = zx;Zy = zy) = f(Y jX = x):
Functions Zx and Zy are adding more information regarding the joint distribution of Y and X
allowing us to go beyond the Fr echet bounds for parameter 0. Ridder and Mott (2007) overview
the cases where numeric identiers Zx and Zy are a priori available and their joint distribution is
normal. Here, we argue that such numeric identiers are typically unavailable and the data entries
that may potentially be useful are typically strings of characters. However, we can still identify
the consumer model of interest in the following way. First, we extract the parts of entries in the
merged databases that can be used for matching. Second, we select an appropriate distance measure
between the entries. And, third, we estimate the model for the trimmed subset of matches where
the distance between the entries is below a selected threshold. In Appendix A we provide a brief
overview of distance measures for string data, that are commonly used in data mining.
Assumption 3 (iii) states that for a pair of matched observations from two databases, their values
of identiers Zx and Zy do not add any information regarding the distribution of the outcome Y
conditional on the regressor X. In other words, if the data is already matched, the constructed
identiers only label observations and do not improve any knowledge about the estimated economic
model. As in the example of matching the observations by the names, once we extract all model-
relevant information from the name (for instance, whether a specic individual is likely to be a
male of a female, white, black or hispanic) and we already matched the information from the two
databases, the name itself will not be important for the model and will only play the role of a label
for a particular observation.
We recognize that Assumption 3 puts restrictions on the behavior of infrequent realizations of
identiers Zx and Zy. Specically, we expect that conditional on the identier taking a high value,
the values of identiers constructed from two datasets have to be close. We can illustrate this
7assumption by our empirical application, where we construct a categorical variable from the 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names of individuals that we observe in two datasets. We can rank the names by their general
frequencies in the population. Those frequencies tend to decline exponentially with the frequency
rank of the name. As a result, conditioning on rare names in both datasets, we will be able to
identify a specic person with a high probability. In other words, the entries with same rare name
in the combined datasets are likely to correspond to the same individual.
In general, the construction of identiers allowing us to merge two datasets combines the information
from the string entries of the data and numeric entries. In Appendix A we provide examples of
possible distance measures that can be used for the string data. Then we can construct the distance
between the data entries by combining the distance measure used for strings with the Euclidean
distance which we can use for the numeric data. For instance, in the empirical application we use
such variables in individual entries as the number of restaurant reviews given by a particular user
in a specic zip code in the Yelp.com data, and the zip code of an individual in the property tax
data. We also use indicators of the name of an individual in the property tax data belonging to
the list of most common hispanic, black and asian names in 2009 US Census data and the cuisine
of the restaurant reviewed, under the assumption that individuals of each specic ethnicity would
prefer their ethnic cuisine. There are multiple examples of computationally optimal construction of
individual identiers which are based on clustering the data with some priors on the relationship
between the variables in two datasets. For instance, Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) uses the
collection of individual movie choices in the Netix dataset and on imdb.com.
Similar identiers are constructed on a daily basis by online advertising companies trying to predict
the probability of a consumer action (for instance, a click on the ad) based on the available character-
istics of a consumer query. An advertising company usually considers a model of the probability of
a consumer action as a function of consumer characteristics. Given that all consumer characteristics
are not available for all the queries, they need to be inferred from the information contained in the
query and the information that has already been collected by the advertising company.
3 Identication with Combined Data
In this section, we formalise the discussion in section 2 and introduce notions of point identication
and partial identication of the econometric model from combined data. We suppose henceforth
that Assumptions 1-3 hold.
In our model, variables Y and X are contained in separate datasets. Because from the dataset
containing Y we can construct the identier Zy and from the dataset containing X we can construct
the identier Zx, in the limit the available data will be represented by the joint distribution of
(Y;Zy) and the joint distribution of (X;Zx). These two joint distributions by themselves, however,
will not be completely informative of the joint distribution of Y and X. The identication of the
econometric model (which in our case reduces to identication of 0 from (2.1)) will only be possible
8if two datasets are merged at least for some observations. On the other hand, data combination
is an intrinsically nite sample procedure. This leads us to the idea of discussing identication in
terms of the limit of statistical experiments. To our knowledge, this is a new approach to parameter
identication from combined data.
The identication idea lies in considering each nite sample size and constructing a subsample, or
a combined dataset, of what we believe to be matching entries in the two datasets. The parameter
value of interest then can be constructed using the sample distribution. Considering databases
of increasing sizes, we can build a sequence of estimated parameter values corresponding to the
sequence of empirical distributions of observations in the combined dataset. We provide conditions
under which this sequence of parameter values converges to the true value of the parameter of
interest, leading to the (point) identication of 0.
























0. Provided that the indices of matching entries are not known in advance, the same
index entries do not necessarily belong to the same individual.
The largest combined dataset will contain N = minfNx;Nyg entries. We now characterize the joint





for each pair of elements i and j. Note that this density is equal to the product of marginal densities
if i and j correspond to dierent individuals and it is equal to the joint density if it corresponds to
the same individual.
Notation. Dene mij as the indicator of the event that i and j are the same individual.
We note that if two data entries do not belong to the same individual, provided that the data are
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i ) = 1, the researcher assigns entries i and j to the same individual the same
individual, otherwise, she considers them to belong to dierent individuals.
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;
9for a chosen N such that 0 < N <  . This decision uses identiers Zy and Zx to gain some
knowledge about the joint distribution of (Y;X) in the following way. If, for a chosen N, we
nd a data entry i with jzx
i j > 1












j) to be observations corresponding to the same individual. This seems to be a good strategy
when N is small because according to Assumption 3, in that case the conditional probability of
Zx and Zy being close to each other when Zx is large in the absolute value is close to 1. This
probability however may still be strictly smaller than 1, which makes our matching rule imperfect.




i ) 6= mij;
and the probability of making incorrect matches is strictly positive for each individual in the given
samples.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we use the absolute value as the distance measure d(). This is
appropriate when the data can be categorized. For instance, if the data contain names of individuals,
we can assign numeric indices to the names according to their frequency rank in the Census. Our
results will be valid for other denitions of the distances between the identiers when such a numeric
indexation will not be plausible.
Intuitively, if there is a \sucient" number of data entries which we identify as matched observations,
we have \enough" knowledge about the joint distribution of (Y;X) to estimate the model of interest.
The proposition below gives us an auxiliary result on the conditional moments of (Y;X;) for
infrequent observations.








= E [(Y;X;) j X = x]: (3.2)
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix.
Equation (3.2) is an important part of our argument because it allows us to use the subpopulation
with relatively infrequent characteristics to identify the parameter of the moment equation that
is valid for the entire population. So if in the data from Durham, NC we nd that two datasets
both contain last names \Komarova", \Nekipelov" and \Yakovlev", we can use that subsample to
identify the model for the rest of the population in North Carolina. Another important feature of
this moment equation is that it does not require us to have the distance between two identiers to
be equal to zero. In other words, if we see last name \Nekipelov" in one dataset and \Nikipelov" in
the other dataset, we can still associate both entries with the same individual.
A clear characterization of identication using infrequent data attributes can be given in the bivariate
linear model. Let Y and X be two scalar random variables and let parameter 0 be 0 = (a0;b0).
10The consumer model of interest is characterized by
E [Y   a0   b0X j X = x] = 0:
This restriction implies the following two equations:
0 = E[Y   a0   b0X] = E[X(Y   a0   b0X)];




; a0 = E[Y ]   b0E[X]:
In order to characterize the identied parameters via conditioning only on the matching rule, we
consider the equations for the coecients as solutions to the following system of equations:






















g]1=2 we can represent the





E[Y ]   b0()E[X]
E[1fjZx   Zyj < ;jZxj > 1
g]1=2:
Proposition 1 implies that b0() = b0 and a0() = a0 for any  2 (0;  ).
Thus, if the joint distribution of (Y;X) for infrequent observations with

jZxj > 1
;jZx   Zyj < 
	










even for extremely small  > 0. Using this approach we eectively ignore a large portion of ob-
servations of covariates and concentrate only on observations with extreme values of identiers.
The observations with more common values of identiers have a higher probability of creating false
matches and, thus, are less valuable for the purpose of data combination.
Density fN() characterizes the joint distribution of matched pairs. We interpret the expectation
EN[] as the integral over density fN(). The distribution fN() does not coincide with the distri-
bution of a sample we would have drawn from the joint distribution of (Y;X;Zy;Zx) because of a
positive probability of making a matching error. As a result, even though (3.2) holds, expectation
EN[] does not coincide with E[]. We now evaluate the quality of approximation of the true ex-
pectation with EN[] approaching the cuto points N to zero as the size of both matched datasets
increases.
11We denote by AN a collection of functions   X 7! Rp (where p is the dimension of the moment
function ()) which are pointwise partial limits of EN[(yj;xi;) j xi = x] for a given decision rule.
We instroduce the distance r() that measures the proximity of the conditional moment vector to





g(a;) = E [h(X)a(;X)];
with a (nonlinear) J  p, J  k, instrument h(X) and a J  J positive denite matrix W.








is called the set of parameter values identiable from infrequent attribute values.
The next denition gives a notion of point identication of 0.
DEFINITION 2. Let 1 =
T1
N=1 N. We say that parameter 0 is point identied from infre-
quent attribute values if 1 = f0g.
Our notion of identication relies on our choice of distance r() and on the selected decision rule for
data combination, including the behavior of this rule as the dataset size increases. If the parameter
of interest cannot be identied in the combined data, then 1 is the best approximation to this
parameter.
Next we can dene partial identication of the parameter of interest.
DEFINITION 3. We say that 0 is partially identied from infrequent attribute values if
0 2 1 but 1 6= f0g:
4 Data Combination and the Risk of Disclosure
Denition 2 characterizes our idea of point identication based on the limit of conditional means
that are re-constructed from nite samples of merged observations. In this section, we explicitly
show that data combination will be associated with the risk of disclosure. Using a specic denition
of disclosure risk, we will show how identication of the model from infrequent attribute values will
be aected with the required limits imposed on the risk of disclosure.
The limits on the risk of disclosure for each individual is the main reason why we dene identication
and non-disclosure guarantee through the limits of sequences of conditional means and probabilities
12of correct matches and do not attempt to do this in terms of the population distributions of (Y;Zy)
and (X;Zx). Notions of identication and non-disclosure guarantee in terms of the population
distributions would ignore what may happen to individuals from a subset of measure zero. In other
words, it would require conditions for non-disclosure guarantee to hold for almost every individual
in the population rather than for every individual. But the ability to guarantee non-disclosure for
every individual is essential, and therefore such a population approach does not serve our purpose.











i j < N

(4.3)
of a successful match of zx
i and z
y
j under our matching rule can be very high for suciently small
N. This means that the pair of entries in two databases will correspond to the same individual with
a very high level of condence, which means that the linkage attack on each database will be quite
successful. To measure the risk of disclosure in the possible linkage attacks we use the denition of
the pessimistic disclosure risk in Lambert (1993). In terms of our data model, we can formalize the
pessimistic disclosure risk as the maximum probability of a linkage attack over all individuals in the
database.
















ij(x) = 1   :
The value of  is called the bound on the disclosure risk.
It is important to note that the risk of disclosure needs to be controlled in any size dataset with any
realization of the values of covariates. In other words one needs to provide an ad omnia guarantee
that the probability of a successful match will not exceed the provided bound. This requirement is
very dierent from the guarantee with probability one, as here we need to ensure that even for the
datasets that may be observed with an extremely low probability, the match probability honors the
imposed bound. For example, if the limit of N
ij(x) is equal to 1  , this means that for any dataset
one incorrect matches occur with probability at least  , and thus, the value of   is the extent of
non-disclosure risk guarantee. This means that in any dataset of size N there will be at least O(N )
matches per observation.2
The bound on the individual disclosure does not mean that making a correct match is impossible.
Instead, in this case due to the \imperfect" matching rule along with correct matches the researcher
2As a result, for some very small datasets the bound will be attained trivially. For instance if   = :1 and both
matched datasets has 2 elements each, then to provide the disclosure risk guarantee, each element has to have 2
elements in the other datasets as matches. This means that the actual probability of an incorrect match is 1/2.
13can nd equally good incorrect matches. This means that there will be multiple versions of the
combined dataset. One of these versions will correspond to the \true" combined datast. However,
along with it one can construct the datasets where threre is a fraction of incorrect of matches. The
probability   indicates the highest proportion of the incorrect matches in the constructed version
of the combined dataset. Then all possible versions will have the proportion of incorrect matches
varying from 0 (in the \true" version) to   (in the most contaminated version). Next we consider
how this idea of the dataset combination when we impose a bound on the disclosure risk translates
into the properties of the estimator of interest.
The next proposition describes the limiting behavior of the moment function EN[(yj;xi;)jxi = x].
Proposition 2. Let N ! 0 as N ! 1. Suppose that Pr

mij = 0 j jzx







 as N ! 1. Then, for almost all x,
EN[(yj;xi;)jxi = x] ! (1   )E[(Y;X;)jX = x] + E[(e Y ; X;)jX = x] (4.4)
where E denotes the expectation taken over the distribution fY (e y)fX(x).
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix.






(1   )E[(Y;X;)jX = x] + E[(e Y ; X;)jX = x]

:
In particular, if there is a value of  that gives for almost all x 2 X the value 0 to the limiting
function in (4.4), then
1() =
n
 2  : (1   )E[(Y;X;)jX = x] + E[(e Y ; X;)jX = x] = 0 for almost all x 2 X
o
:
The following result on point identication is an implication of Proposition 2. It establishes that 0
is point identied from observations with infrequent values of the attributes if non-disclosure is not
guaranteed, that is, if in the limit all our matches are correct.
THEOREM 1. (Point identication of 0). Let N ! 0 as N ! 1. Suppose there is
no non-disclosure guarantee. Then 0 is point identied from matches on infrequent values of the
attributes.
Proof. The absence of non-disclosure guarantee means that the the only possible asymptotic behavior
of the conditional probabilities Pr

mij = 0 j jzx






is their convergence to 0.
For  = 0, the limiting function in (4.4) is E[(Y;X;)jX = x], which according to Assumption 1
takes value 0 for almost all x 2 X only at the parameter value 0. Hence, 1 = f0g.
The theorem below gives a partial identication result.
14THEOREM 2. (Partial identication of 0). Let N ! 0 as N ! 1. Suppose there is
a bound  > 0 imposed on the disclosure risk. Then in general 0 is identied from matches on





where () is as dened after Proposition 2.
Thus, the identied set is the collection of parameter values obtained in the limit under all possible
extents of non-disclosure guarantee  up to the disclosure risk bound . Elements in (),  2 (0;],
are in general dierent from 0, which means that 1 is non-singleton.
Proof. First of all, note that () = f0g, and therefore, 0 2 1. Second, having the bound  on
the disclosure risk means that it is possible to have convergence Pr

mij = 0 j jzx







 as N ! 1 for any  2 [0;]. These facts together with Proposition 2 and denitions 1 and 3
yield the result of the theorem.
Using the result of Theorem 2, we are able to provide a clear characterization of the identied set
in the linear case.
THEOREM 3. Consider a linear model with 0 dened by
E[Y   X00jX = x] = 0;
where E[XX0] has full rank. Suppose there is a bound  > 0 on the disclosure risk. Then 0 is only
partially identied from infrequent attribute values, and, under the distance r() chosen in the spirit
of least squares, the identied set is the following collection of convex combinations of parameters 0
and 1:
1 = f; 2 [0;] :  = (1   )0 + 1g;
where 1 is the parameter value one would obtain using only incorrect matches. In terms of Propo-
sition 2, 1 would be obtained if in the limit matches were incorrect with probability 1.
Note that 0 = E[XX0] 1E[XY ]. E[XX0] can be found from the marginal distribution of X
and, thus, is identied without any matching procedure. The value of E[XY ] however can be
found only if the joint distribution of (Y;X) is known in the limit, that is, only if there is no non-
disclosure guarantee. The key insight in Theorem 3 is that if the match is incorrect, then we are
combining the values of X and Y that belong to dierent individuals and, therefore, these values
are independent. When we consider independent X and Y with distributions fX() and fY (), we
have E[X(Y   X0)] = 0. Solving the last equation we obtain
1 = EX[XX0] 1EX[X]EY [Y ]; (4.5)
15which can be found from split samples without using any matching methodology. When the combined
data contains correct and incorrect matches, the resulting estimator will be a mixture of estimators
are obtain for correct and incorrect matches (0 and 1 correspondingly).
As a special case, consider a bivariate linear regression model
E[Y   a0   b0XjX = x] = 0:
Using our previosu calculations, we obtain that the identied set for the slope coecient is
fb : b = (1   )b0;  2 [0;]g
because b1 = 0, and for the intercept it is
fa : a = (1   )a0 + EY [Y ];  2 [0;]g = fa : a = EY [Y ]   (1   )b0EX[X];  2 [0;]g:
The complete proof of Theorem 3 can be found in the Appendix.
Next, we analyze what should be the restrictions on the marginal distributions of identiers to allow
for imposing bounds on the disclosure risk.
Proposition 3. (Absence of non-disclosure risk guarantee). Let N > 0, N ! 0 be chosen



































where () and  () are functions in Assumption 3. Then non-disclosure is not guaranteed.
As a consequence of this proposition, parameter 0 is point identied from matching observations.





































Then non-disclosure is guaranteed.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that whether non-disclosure is guaranteed or not depends on whether
the thresholds 1
N , above which the values of zx
i or z
y
i are not revealed, grow slowly or fast as the
sample size increases. The example below claries and sheds light on this issue.
16EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that () =  and  () =  for 0 <  <   < 1. In the Appendix, we use






as N ! 1, then there is no non-disclosure guarantee, whereas if N > 0
are chosen in such a way that maxfNx;Nyg1=5N ! c > 0 as N ! 1, then non-disclosure is
guaranteed. Thus, in the former case, when non-disclosure is not guaranteed, thresholds 1
N grow
faster than maxfNx;Nyg. In the latter case, when non-disclosure is guaranteed, thresholds 1
N grow
at the rate maxfNx;Nyg1=5.
So far, we have shown that the presence of \thin sets" of consumers allows us to identify the
parameters of the econometric model. However, the fact that we are using possibly small subset of
consumers to estimate the behavior model, the obtained estimates may reveal information on those
consumers. For instance suppose that consumer response Y is a discrete variable with values 0 and 1
and the consumer attribute X is a continuous variable with the support on [0;1] and Y is contained
in the internal rm data and X is the information from the public dataset. Suppose that as a result
of the merge we constructed a dataset with two observations (0;0) and (1;1). As a result, we t
a linear model y = x to the data. If the rm reveals this estimate, one would be able to correctly
predict the response of an individual with the attribute value X = 1 using the model. This means
that the estimates themselves may cause a threat of disclosure, as in reality the response Y would
correspond to the purchase of a specic product by an individual, or a visit to a specic webpage,
or the answer in an online questionnaire.
Moreover, the example of micro-targeted online advertising in Korolova (2010) shows that the rm
does not even need to release the model in order to create a disclosure threat. Korolova (2010)
conducts a eld experiment on Facebook.com where users are required to supply their information
such as age, but they may also choose to make that information \private" which will not be observable
by other Facebook users. Some uses may also have attributes, such as their favorite band, the city
of origin or their sexual orientation, that will only be visible to their \friends". Facebook has a
very advanced set of targeting tools available to its advertisers. Even though, the advertisers cannot
explicitly request to have their ads shown to specic users, they can target ads to very narrow user
groups. It turns out, one can \single out" some users that by setting the set of targets based on
publicly observable user attributes (i.e. not those observable only by \friends"). Then, for instance,
one can recover the unobservable age of the user by constructing dierent versions of the ad that
will be shown if the targeted user in a specic age group. Then knowing which ad was shown, the
advertiser will recover the user's age.
Returning to our previous example, suppose that the consumer model is used by the online adver-
tising rm and evaluates the probability of consumer click. Suppose that the advertising rm does
not reveal the estimates of the model but allows ad targeting. Then the advertiser can choose to
target the consumer with the attribute value X = 1 and ask the advertising company to show the
ad only if the click probability is higher than 0:99::: (so that the ad will be very \relevant" to
this consumer). Then the fact that the ad was shown, allows the advertiser to correctly recover the
17response of consumer with the attribute X = 1.
5 Empirical Application
5.1 Data collection
To illustrate our results on relationship between the bound on the disclosure risk and identication
of economic model, we estimate the model of consumer restaurant choices determined by consumer
demographics and mutual location of restaurants and consumer residences.
We collected the dataset from the public access websites on the Internet. To collect the information
regarding the consumer ratings of restaurants we use the data from Yelp.com and to collect the data
on the demographics we used the database of residential property taxes.
The collected data comes from Durham, NC. Property tax data was extracted from Durham county
government web-site, tax administration record search (see http://www.ustaxdata.com/nc/durham/).
Property tax bills are stored by the parcel numbers. Going over the list of all parcel numbers we
collected data from property tax bills for years 2009/2010. In total we collected 104068 tax bills
for year 2010 and 103445 tax bills for year 2009. Each bill contains information on taxable value of
property, rst and last names of the taxpayer and the location of the property (house number, street,
and zip code). Then we merged the data between the years 2009 and 2010 by the parcel number
and the property owner, removing the properties that change the owner from year to year. Property
tax data allows us to assemble information on the name and location of individuals as well as an
indicator of their wealth (as indicated by the taxable value of the property). Table 1 summarizes
the distribution of taxable property values in the constructed dataset of tax bills.
[Table 1 about here.]
We demonstrate the distribution of taxable values of the properties on Figure 1. As we collect the
entire dataset of the property tax bills, some of them are actually commercial properties. These are
the outliers seen on the histogram.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Separately we collected the data on the individual restaurant reviews. For the source of that infor-
mation we solely used the public data from Yelp.com corresponding to the restaurants located in
Durham, NC (see http://www.yelp.com/durham-nc). First, we assembled the list of local restaurants
in Durham that are represented on Yelp.com. Then for each restaurant we collected the information
on that restaurant that is represented on its yelp.com page such as exact address, cuisine, price
level (given by the brackets), family and children-friendly indicators. Then for each restaurant we
collected the data on the personal reviews that were given by the Yelp.com users. Yelp.com has
18reviewer user names that are in the format of the rst name and the rst letter of the last name.
For each reviewer-restaurant pair we collected the data on the reviewer rating of the restaurant that
can assign the grade from 1 to 5 to the restaurant with 5 being the highest grade. The dataset
from Yelp.com for the Durham, NC produces the entries for 485 Yelp.com users who wrote 2326
reviews to 290 (out of 343 listed) Durham restaurants. We show the summary statistics for the
constructed variables in Table 2. Figure 2 demonstrates the sample distributions of the attributes:
distribution of restaurant ratings, distribution of the restaurant price levels, and the distribution of
the restaurants by the zip codes.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Next, we constructed the individual identiers using the rank cuto rule combining the edit distance
using the rst and last name in the property tax dataset and the user name on Yelp.com (see
Appendix A), and the sum of ranks indicating that the taxpayer in the tax data is located in the
same zip code as the restaurant. Given this simple matching rule, we identied 304 Yelp.com users
as positive matches. Sixty six people are uniquely identiable in both databases. Table 3 shows
the distribution of obtained matches. One-to-one matches correspond to the edit distance zero,
one-to-two matches correspond to the edit distance one, etc.
[Table 3 about here.]
The matched observations characterize the constructed merged dataset of Yelp reviews and the
property tax bills. We were able to nd the reviewers in Yelp and the property owners in the
property tax bills for whom the the combined edit distance and the Euclidean distance between the
numeric indicators (zip code and location of most frequent reviews) is equal to zero. We call this
dataset the set of \one-to-one" matches. Based on reviewer rst name we evaluate sex of reviewer
and construct dummy variable indicating that the name of the indiuvidual in the taxpayer data has
a name that belongs to the list of top 500 female names in the US from the Census data (as a proxi
that the corresponding taxpayer is a female). We also constructed the indices for other demographic
indicators, but their coecients were insignicant in our structural model and we do not incorporate
them into our analysis. The statistics in the \one-to-one" matches dataset is summarized in Table
4
[Table 4 about here.]
5.2 Individual restaurant rating model
In our empirical application we address an important problem of recovering individual preferences
from split sample data. Such problems frequently arise in online ad targeting. Ad targeting requires
19estimation of individual propensity to perform a certain action (such as a click or a purchase)
conditional on individual attributes. If the advertising company possesses only observational data,
estimation of such a model requires the merge between the purchase data and the data on the online
activity of consumers. Without the merged data the consumer action model needs to be estimated
only based on the observed recorded consumer activity. This leads to a familiar data selection
problem. Our theoretical ndings show a clear trade-o between the privacy restrictions and the
ability to identify an econometric model. This means that the higher are the requirements imposed
on the disclosure risk, the less information the researcher has regarding the size of the selection and,
therefore, the less ecient targeting will be.
Table 5 provides evidence of the selection in our data. Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates for the
probability of giving an review (probit model) for a certain restaurant considering the reviewers
from the\one-to-one match" dataset with and without restaurant xed eects. We can see that the
reviews that we do observe are coming from the individuals who are more prone to give the restaurant
reviews in the rst place. We can model this selection using the individual characteristics that we
can construct from the merged tax and yelp.com data. In other words, we will model the propensity
to give review determined by, rst, the propensity of an individual to go to a restaurant (which
is function of income, location and other demographics). And then, conditional on the individual
dining in a restaurant, the propensity to give a review will be determined by the individual's (dis)-
satisfaction by the restaurant.
[Table 5 about here.]
We formalize this using the following individual decision model. An individual extracts the utility
from dining in a restaurant that depends on the vector of restaurant-specic characteristics x1 and
the vector of demographic characteristics of an individual (such as wealth, location, and ethnicity).
The utility also depends on the individual-specic idiosyncratic component , and on the restaurant-
specic idiosyncratic component e, which are not observed by the econometrician. The full ex post
utility of an individual is dened as
U = u(x1;x)      e;
where we assume that it is separable in deterministic component u(;) and the stochastic component
 + e. Then the individual decision problem is the following. First, the individual makes a decision
to go to a restaurant based on his or her expectation of the restaurant quality:
d0 = 1fu(x1;x)      E[e]  0g:
We assume that consumers can correctly evaluate the uncertainty regarding the restaurant quality.
Second, after making the decision to dine at the restaurant, the individual decides to write a review
highly rating the restaurant if the ex post utility from visiting the restaurant exceeds a certain
threshold:
d1 = 1fju(x1;x)      ej  ug:
20In other words, we expect the individual to write a review if he or she was either very happy of very
unhappy with the dining experience. Finally, the restaurant rating will be positive if the individual
was pleased with the dining experience:
d2 = 1fu(x1;x)      e  ug:
In the data we observe the decision to write a favorable review along with the restaurant data
y = (d2;x1) for all people who wrote a review and we can observe the individual characteristics x.
It is clear that without the additional demographic information we would not be able to correctly
estimate the parameters of the decision problem only based on the restaurant rating data. In fact,
we only observe the data for individuals who indeed came to the restaurant and wrote a review. This
is the main source of the activity bias in this environment.
Now we map the structural elements of the model (individual's deterministic utility component) to
the observable variables. Assume that utility shocks e and  are mutually independent and they
are also independent from the observable characteristics of consumers and restaurants. We also
normalize the distributions of unobserved shocks assuming that e  N(0;1) and   N(0;2).
Then, the probability of decision to write a positive review, given that an individual writes a review






d1 = d0 = 1;x1;x;

=
Prfe  u(x1;x)   u    j d0 = 0;x;x1;g
Prfju(x1;x)   e   j  u j d0 = 0;x;x1;g
=
(u(x1;x)   u   )
(u(x1;x)   u   ) + ( u(x1;x)   u + )
;
where () is the cdf of standard normal distribution. Finally, recalling that we normalized the
restaurant-specic shock which leads to E[e] = 0. This means that we can determine the density
of the distribution of individual-specic utility shocks for those people who choose to dine at the
restaurant:





(u(x1;x)); if   u(x1;x);
0 otherwise;
where '() is the standard normal density. As a result, we are able to express the observable
probability of a favorable review by taking the expectation over the utility shocks for consumers
















(u(x1;x)   u   ) + ( u(x1;x)   u + )
d:
We can establish non-parametric identication of deterministic component of individual utility given
the specied assumptions on unobservable variables and the individual decision.
21THEOREM 4. Suppose that there exist x
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d1 = d0 = 1;x1;x

has non-zero
matrix of rst derivatives (or rst dierences for discrete covariates) with respect to x1 and x, then
structural parameters of the model fu(;); u; g are identied.
Provided that this identication result, we can use our data to estimate the structural parameters
of the model. Taking into account the size of the merged dataset that were able to create as well
as our desire to compare the results from standard linear models, we choose to further parametrise
individual utility, assuming that it is linear.
Table 6 presents the estimated parameters of the structural model. As one can see, selection has
a very large impact on the obtained estimates. The results indicate a large sizeable impact of the
property value on the individual utility index. In other words an individual with a more expensive
property is more likely to go to a restaurant. Also we nd that Japanese and Mexican restaurants
tend to have a high positive impact on the utility index as well.
[Table 6 about here.]
5.3 Data protection: k-anonymity and the quality of point identication
As our analysis shows, using a simple notion of the edit distance for the string entries in combination
with the Euclidean distance for numeric entries in the database of Yelp.com users and the property
tax data from Durham county, allows us nd 65 users for whom there exist counterparts in each
database with the distance equal to zero. This means that we successfully performed the linkage
attack on the Yelp reviews database. This in fact allowed us to construct the point estimates for
our consumer behavior model.
Now we can analyze how the parameters will be aected if we want to enforce a bound on the
disclosure risk. To do that we use the notion of k-anonymity. k-anonymity requires that for each
observation in the main database there is at least k equally good matches in the auxiliary database.
In our data the main attribute that was essential for correct matches was the name and the last name
information. To break these links, we started erasing letters from individual names. For instance,
we transform the name \Denis" to \Deni*" then to \Den*". Then if in the Yelp data we observe the
users with names \Dennis" and \Denis" and in the property tax data we observe the name \Denis",
then the edit distance between \Denis" and \Denis" is zero which is denitely smaller than the edit
distance between \Dennis" and \Denis" (equal to 1). Then in property tax data we suppressed the
last two letters leading to transformation \Den*", the distance between both \Dennis" and \Denis"
and \Den*" is the same.
Using character suppression we managed to attain k-anonymity with k = 2 and k = 3 by erasing,
correspondingly 3 and 4 letters from the name recorded in the property tax database. The fact
22that there is no perfect matches for a selected value of the distance threshold, leads to the set
of minimizers of the distance function. To construct the identied set, we use the idea from our
identication argument by representing the identied set as a convex hull of the point estimates
obtained for dierent combinations of the two datasets. We select the edit distance equal to k in
each of the cases of k-anonymity as the match threshold. Then for each entry in the Yelp database
that has at least one counterpart in the property tax data with the edit distance less or equal to k, we
construct the dataset of potential matches in Yelp and the dataset of possible matched observations
in the property tax dataset. Then, we construct matched databases using each potentially matched
pair. As a result, if we have, for instance, N observations in the Yelp database each having exactly
k counterparts in the property tax database, then we construct kN matched datasets. For each such
matched dataset we can construct the point estimates. Figure 3 demonstrates the two-dimensional
cuts of the obtained identied set of parameters under k-anonymity with the original point estimates.
[Figure 3 about here.]
As we can see, although some parameters maintain their sign when the identied set is constructed
(such as price of the restaurant, property values, and gender), other parameters have the identied
set including the origin. As a result, one is not even able to infer their correct signs if k-anonymity
is enforced.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze an important problem of identication of econometric model from the split
sample data without common numeric variables. Data combination with combined string an numeric
variables requires the measures of proximity between strings, which we borrow from the data mining
literature. Model identication from combined data cannot be established using the traditional
machinery as the population distributions only characterize the marginal distribution of the data in
the split samples without providing the guidance regarding the joint data distribution. As a result,
we need to embed the data combination procedure (which is an intrinsically nite sample procedure)
into the identication argument. Then the model identication can be dened in terms of the limit
of the sequence of parameters inferred from the samples with increasing sizes. We discover, however,
that in order to provide identication, one needs to establish some strong links between the two
databases. The presence of these links means that the identities of the corresponding individuals
will be disclosed with a very high probability. Using the example of targeted online advertising,
we show that the identity disclosure may occur even when the data is not publicly shared. We
then investigate the possibility of imposing the bound on the disclosure risk. Such a bound can be
enforced by using one of many available methods such as k-anonymity or synthetic data. However,
we nd that the presence of the bound on the disclosure risk will also lead to the loss of point
identication of the model.
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Appendix
A Construction of individual identiers
The key element of our identication argument is based on the construction of the identifying
variables Zy and Zx such that we can merge some or all observations in the disjoint databases to be
26able to estimate the econometric model of interest. While we took the existence of these variables
as given, their construction in itself is an important issue and there is a vast literature in applied
statistics and computer science that is devoted to the analysis of the broken record linkage. For
completeness of the analysis in our paper we present some highlights from that literature.
In general the task of merging disjoint databases is a routine necessity in may practical applications.
In many cases there do exist perfect cross-database identiers of individual entries. There could be
multiple reasons why that is the case. For instance, there could be errors in data entry and process-
ing, wrong variable formatting, and duplicate data entry. The idea that has arisen in Newcombe,
Kennedy, Axford, and James (1959) and was later formalized in Fellegi and Sunter (1969) was to
treat the record linkage problem as a problem of classication of record subsets into matches, non-
matches and uncertain cases. This classication is based on dening the similarity metric between
each two records. Then given the similarity metric one can compute the probability of particular pair
of records being a match or non-match. The classication of pairs is then performed by xing the
probability of erroneous identication of a non-matched pair of records as a match and a matched
pair of records as a non-match by minimizing the total proportion of pairs that are uncertain. This
matching technique is based on the underlying assumption of randomness of records being broken.
As a result, using the sample of perfectly matched records one can recover the distribution of the
similarity metric for the matched and unmatched pairs of records. Moreover, as in hypothesis test-
ing, one needs to x the probability of record mis-identication. Finally, the origin of the similarity
metric remains arbitrary.
A large fraction of the further literature was devoted to, on one hand, development of classes of
similarity metrics that accommodate non-numeric data and, on the other hand, development of fast
and scalable record classication algorithms. For obvious reasons, measuring the similarity of string
data turns out to be the most challenging. Edit distance (see, Guseld (1997) for instance) is a
metric that can be used to measure the string similarity. The distance between the two strings is
determined as the minimum number of insert, delete and replace operations required to transform
one string into another. Another measure developed in Jaro (1989) and elaborated in Winkler (1999)
is based on the length of matched strings, the number of common characters and their position within
the string. In its modication it also allows for the prexes in the names and is mainly intended to
linking relatively short strings such as individual names. Alternative metrics are based on splitting
strings into individual \tokens" that are substrings of a particular length and then analyzing the
power of sets of overlapping and non-overlapping tokens. For instance, Jaccard coecient is based
on the relative number of overlapping and overall tokens in two strings. More advanced metrics
include the \TF/IDF" metric that is based on the term frequency, or the number of times the term
(or token) appears in the document (or string) and the inverse document frequency, or the number
of documents containing the given term. The structure of the TF/IDF-based metric construction is
outlined in Salton and Harman (2003). The distance measures may include combination of the edit
distance and the TF/IDF distance such as a fuzzy match similarity metric described in Chaudhuri,
Ganjam, Ganti, and Motwani (2003).
27Given a specic denition of the distance, the practical aspects of matching observations will entail
calibration and application of a particular technique for matching observations. The structure of
those techniques is based on, rst, the assumption regarding the data structure and the nature
of the record errors. Second, it depends on the availability of known matches, and, thus, allows
empirical validation of a particular matching technique. When such a validation sample is available,
one can estimate the distribution of the similarity measures for matched and non-matched pairs for
the validation sample. Then, using the estimated distribution one can assign the matches for the
pairs outside the validation sample. When one can use numeric information in addition to the string
information, one can use hybrid metrics that combine the known properties of numeric data entries
and the properties of string entries.
Ridder and Mott (2007) overviews some techniques for purely numeric data combination. In the
absence of validation subsamples that may incorporate distributional assumptions on the \similar"
numeric variables. For instance, joint normality assumption with a known sign of correlation can
allow one to invoke likelihood-based techniques for record linkage.
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which is equivalent to (3.2).
28Proof of Proposition 2. Note that EN[(yj;xi;)jxi = x] =
AN(x)Pr
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As shown in Proposition 1,
AN(x) = E[(Y;X;) j X = x]:



































Part (ii) of Assumption 3 in particular implies that for two independent random vectors (e Y ; f Zy) and
(X;Zx) with distributions fY;Zy and fX;Zx respectively, for small  > 0, and for almost all x 2 X
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(yj;x;)fY (yj)dyj = E[(e Y ; X;)jX = x]:
To complete the proof, we also take into account that the conditions of the proposition give
lim
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29Proof of Theorem 3. Denote
a(;x;) = (1   )E[Y   X0jX = x] + E[e Y   X0jX = x];
where e Y is distributed according to fY () and is independent of X. Introduce the distance r(a(;x;))
in the spirit of least squares in the following way:
r(a(;x;)) = EX[Xa(;X;)]0 EX[Xa(;X;)]:
Note that
EX[Xa(;X;)] = (1   )E[X(Y   X0)] + E[X(e Y   X0)]
= (1   )E[XY ]   (1   )EX[XX0] + EX[X]EY [e Y ]   EX[XX0]
= (1   )E[XY ] + EX[X]EY [Y ]   EX[XX0]
= EX[XX0]
 
(1   )EX[XX0] 1E[XY ] + EX[XX0] 1EX[X]EY [Y ]   

= EX[XX0]((1   )0 + 1   ):
Clearly, EX[Xa(;X;)] takes value 0 and, consequently, r(a(;x;)) takes its minimum value i
 = (1   )0 + 1. In other words,
 = f(1   )0 + 1g:
Theorem 2 the implies the result of this theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3. Probability N






i j < N;jzx
i j > 1








i j < N;jzx
i j > 1
N jmij = 1






i j < N;jzx
i j > 1





where Px is the notation for conditioning on xi = x. Note that Px(mij = 1) = 1
maxfNx;Nyg.
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The same nal expression in the inequality is obtained if Zx can take negative as well as positive
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Therefore, there is no non-disclosure guarantee.
Proof of Proposition 4. Probability N
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;
where we imposed that o(()) and o( ()) in Assumption 3 are non-decreasing. This condition
can be imposed without a loss of generality. The same nal expression in the inequality is obtained
if Zx can take negative as well as positive values.
Taking into account this result, condition (4.7) and the fact that N > 0 for all N, we conclude that













































To summarize, non-disclosure is guaranteed.
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32Now use the fact that for m > 0, the function m + 1
 attains its minimum for  > 0 at the point
 = 1=
p
m. This minimum value is equal to 2
p
m. Taking this account, we obtain that the innite
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and () = , we obtain that the convergence maxfNx;NygN ! 0 as N ! 1 implies that the






































(k 2 + 1)2((k + 1) 2 + 1)2 < 1;
we conclude that the convergence maxfNx;Nyg5
N ! c > 0 implies that (4.7) in Proposition 4 is
satised and, thus, privacy is guaranteed.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the observed positive rating probability at points (x
1;x) and
(x




























(1   u   z)'(z)
(1   u   z) + ( 1   u + z)
dz:
We note that for any  > 0 and u > 0 the gradients of the right-hand side of both equations
are not equal to zero. Moreover, both right-hand sides are monotone increasing in  and monotone
decreasing in u taking values from 0 to 1. By the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions
the constructed system of equations has a solution. Moreover, due to strict monotonicity, this
solution is unique.
Finally, given  and u, we can see that the right-hand side is depends on function u(x1;x). We can
dierentiate the right-hand side expression with respect to u(;) as an argument. Then we note
that the gradient of the observed probability with respect to the unknown utility at point (x
1; x)










( u   z) + ( u + z)
dz;





d1 = d0 = 1;x
1;x

and (z) > 0. This expression is strictly positive.
Therefore, integration from u(x
1;x) = 0, of the observed probability, allows us to identify the
utility of consumers.
Q.E.D.
34Figure 1: Empirical distribution of taxable property values in Durham county, NC
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36Figure 3: Parameters of econometric model and identied sets under k-anonymity with k = 2 and 3
37Table 1: Summary statistics from property tax bills in Durham County, NC.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
year 2009-2010
Property: taxable value 207513 261611.9 1723970 78375 140980 213373
year 2010
Property: taxable value 104068 263216.1 1734340 78823.5 141490.5 214169.5
38Table 2: Summary statistics from Yelp.com for the restaurant information in Durham ,NC
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Rating-level data
Rating 2326 3.651 1.052 1 5
Price level 2265 1.631 0.573 1 3
cuisine: Mexican 2326 0.118 0.323 0 1
cuisine: Japanese 2326 0.062 0.242 0 1
cuisine: breakfast 2326 0.113 0.318 0 1
cuisine: Asian 2326 0.092 0.290 0 1
cuisine: American 2326 0.180 0.384 0 1
cuisine: Italian 2326 0.035 0.184 0 1
Restaurant-level data
Average rating 290 3.479 0.796 1 5
Price level 251 1.446 0.558 1 3
39Table 3: Features of edit distance-based matches
# of matches Freq. Percent # of yelp users
1 in yelp   > 1 in tax data 66 1.54 66
1  >2 92 2.19 46
2   > 1 2 2.19 2
1   > 3 72 1.68 24
1  > 4 36 0.84 9
1   > 5 65 1.51 13
1   > 6 114 2.65 19
1   > 7 56 1.3 8
1   > 8 88 2.05 11
1   > 9 81 1.89 9
1  > 10 or more 3,623 84.35 97
Total 4,295 100 304
40Table 4: Summary statistics in matched dataset of property tax bills and Yelp.com reviews
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rating 429 3.492 1.001 1 5
price level 416 1.579 0.584 1 3
cuisine: Mexican 429 0.107 0.310 0 1
cuisine: Japanese 429 0.049 0.216 0 1
cuisine: breakfast 429 0.096 0.294 0 1
cuisine: Asian 429 0.084 0.278 0 1
cuisine: American 429 0.177 0.382 0 1
cuisine: Italian 429 0.051 0.221 0 1
I(city center) 429 0.233 0.423 0 1
I(same zip) 429 0.219 0.414 0 1
I(female) 429 0.214 0.411 0 1
log (property value) 429 12.26 0.634 10.34 13.14
41Table 5: Probit estimates for review probability in matched dataset of property tax bills and
Yelp.com reviews
Pr(give review)
log(property value) 0.129 0.144
[0.038]*** [0.039]***
























Note: Robust standard errors in brackets
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
42Table 6: Estimates from the structural model
Model with truncation (U=1) Model without truncation (U=0)
cuisine: Mexican 0.254 0.541
0.108 0.228
cuisine: Japanese 0.546 1.064
0.211 0.357
cuisine: breakfast 0.088 0.210
0.114 0.223
cuisine: Asian 0.063 0.249
0.112 0.234
cuisine: American 0.024 0.145
0.077 0.178
cuisine: Italian -0.153 -0.482
0.141 0.302




log(property value) 0.019 0.029
0.009 0.017




constant 0 (xed) 0 (xed)
U 1(xed) 0 (xed)
^  0.050 0.0001
0.005 0.002
Note: bootstrapped standard errors in italic
43